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"THAT'S NOT WHAT FERPA SAYS!": THE TENTH 
CIRCUIT COURT GIVES DANGEROUS BREADTH TO 
FERP A IN ITS CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTORY 
FALVO V. OWASSO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
DECISION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District1 began in an 
Oklahoma District Court as a suit by Kristja Falvo on behalf of 
her children against the school district and several teachers 
and administrators within the district. Ms. Falvo's middle 
school children were affected by the district's grading practices, 
and Ms. Falvo sought relief in court. When the district court 
granted summary judgment to the school district, she ap-
pealed. The lOth Circuit Court judges who heard the case on 
appeal held that the grading practices in question infringed on 
the children's right to privacy as delineated in the Family Edu-
cational and Right to Privacy Act (FERPA). 2 As a Federal ap-
peals decision, Falvo directly affects all school districts within 
the lOth circuit's boundaries. 3 As a case of first impression on 
this issue, it may also be influential for other circuits deciding 
similar issues. 
This note will discuss both procedural and substantive ar-
guments on the FERPA issues addressed by the lOth Circuit 
Court. Part I introduces the case and its history; Part II dis-
cusses the procedural arguments, focusing on those against the 
lOth circuit's ruling; Part III examines the substantive argu-
ments against the lOth Circuit Court's decision on the merits in 
Falvo. Part IV is the conclusion. 
1. 220 F.3d 1200, 146 ED. LAW REP. 641, 2000 CJ C.A.R. 4563 (lO'h Cir. Okla-
homa 2000), withdrawn on denial of rehearing en bane and replaced by 229 F.3d 956 
(10'h Cir. 2000). 
2. 20 U.S.C.A. §1232. 
3. The Tenth Circuit encompasses Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. 
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A. Background 
The story began in 1997 when Ms. Falvo's children com-
plained about being embarrassed in class. 4 The family had re-
cently moved into the district, and was unfamiliar with a grad-
ing practice common in many school districts around the 
nation; peer-to-peer grading. Students were asked to exchange 
quiz papers, grade those quiz papers according to guidelines set 
by the teacher, and give the quizzes back to their original own-
ers. They then had the option of either telling the teacher their 
scores orally in front of the class, or coming up to the teacher 
and privately reporting their score. 
The more Ms. Falvo heard about this and how it affected 
her children, the less she liked it. 5 She talked to administra-
tors, including the superintendent6 of the school district, about 
changing the policy. Administrators did not see a problem, es-
pecially in light of the fact that many student-graded quizzes 
never make it into the gradebook,7 and that students who may 
be embarrassed by the process have the opportunity to report 
their grades in confidence.8 Ms. Falvo adamantly felt that the 
grading practice should be changed. 9 She then asked for a tem-
porary injunction to stop teachers from using this grading prac-
tice. The court did not issue an injunction, choosing instead to 
grant the school district more time to prepare a defense. 
Meanwhile, Ms. Falvo filed suit claiming 14'h Amendment and 
FERPA violations. The district court agreed with the school 
4. Scott Cooper, Grading System is Challenged, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 11, 1998 at 
19. 
5. Scott Cooper , Owasso Case Before Judge, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 15, 1998 at 11, 
explaining Falvo's concerns: ridicule of her son and targeting of her daughter which she 
attributes to the grading practice. 
6. "Published Opinions," compiled by Anthony Sammons, THE JouRNAL RECORD, 
8/10/00 J. Rec.; 2000 WL 14297550. 
7. Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 229 F.3d 956, 970 (stating at least some 
grades are then recorded in the teachers gradebook). 
8. !d. at 962. 
9. "There comes a time when I have to say it's time to make a change." Cooper, 
supra note 4, at 19; "(Falvo's] goal is for the district to adopt a policy prohibiting stu-
dents from grading other tests and reading grades aloud." Cooper, supra note 5, at 11; 
"I felt very strongly about it. I felt there was a large population of students being ex-
posed to this grading practice, and it was affecting their learning." Kelly Kurt, Peer 
Grading Fails in Court Test, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 2, 2000 at 19; "It wasn't that I was 
angry and wanted to get at teachers. I just wanted to change policy." Diane Plumberg, 
Nation to Feel Effects oft he Grading Lawsuit, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 6, 2000 at 
4-A. 
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district that both of those claims should be dismissed. Ms. 
Falvo then attempted to eradicate the grading practice by 
amending her complaint so that it included a cause of action 
brought under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA)10 on behalf of her mainstreamed son. However, the 
court disallowed the amendment because it was filed too late. 
Ms. Falvo appealed the case. After the parties had pre-
sented their arguments, the court issued an opinion written by 
Judge Murphy in which the dismissal of the 14th amendment 
claim was upheld, but the dismissal of the FERPA claim was 
overturned. The court held that the grading practice was illegal 
not because the students reported their grades aloud, but be-
cause students had access to each other's work. 11 
In order for this rationale to work legally, the court decided 
that the "education record," which under FERPA could not be 
disclosed without permission, consisted of the student work it-
self. 12 The school district asked the court for a rehearing en 
bane, but the request was denied by a 9-to-4 vote. However, 
Judge Murphy did consider the school district's points after a 
fashion, withdrawing the previous opinion and replacing it 
with one addressing those issues. As of this writing it is uncer-
tain whether the school district will file further appeals. 
B. Initial Concerns 
There are some good reasons why Judge Murphy ruled the 
way he did. However, better reasons indicate that Falvo only 
makes for confusing and impractical law. In the wake of the 
Falvo decision, school districts within the lOth circuit have ear-
13 
nestly attempted to comply. They have sent home a flurry of 
permission forms asking parental sanction for grading prac-
tices which used to be taken for granted by students, teachers, 
and parents alike. School officials have speculated as to 
whether they can allow displays of student art. Teachers de-
bate if they can afford to keep checking for cognition by giving 
quizzes and not be snowed under with the paperwork of grad-
10. Ms. Falvo wanted to claim that the grading practice violated IDEA privacy 
right provisions. 
11. 20 USCA § 1232(g)(b)(1) " ... policy or practice of permitting the release of 
education records .... " 
12. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 971. 
13. Jennifer Toomer-Cook, School Ruling Affects Utahns, THE DESERET NEWS, 
Sept. 9, 2000 at BO.l. 
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ing it all themselves. Parents are confused by the paperwork 
now necessary so that their children can engage in normal and 
everyday school activities. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
A. Improper Ruling on Appeal from Summary Judgment 
Falvo came to the lOth circuit in the posture of an appeal 
from summary judgment for the school district. As such, Judge 
Murphy and the other judges needed to interpret all evidence 
in the light most favorable to Ms. Falvo and her children, 
which they did. However, they should have stopped at the in-
terpretation. Instead of remanding for a trial, they went ahead 
and ruled on several issues, most notably the expansion of the 
definition of "education record" and the creation of an agency 
relationship between the students and the school. Regardless of 
FERPA's ambiguity or lack thereof, another appellate court has 
stated that "the existence of facts giving rise to a principle-
agent relationship is generally a question reserved for the trier 
of fact."14 Thus, if nothing else, the lOth Circuit Court should 
have remanded this decision back to the trial level for a deter-
mination of fact. 
B. Authority to Bring the Claim 
Because the FERPA statute only offers administrative 
remedies, 15 courts are in dispute about whether it is possible to 
bring a private action to enforce redress of statutory violations. 
As of 1998, when Falvo was filed in district court, most courts16 
14. Knapp v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3''376, 382 (1995). 
15. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(g) (West 2000). 
16. Odom v. Columbia University, 906 F. Supp. 188, 105 Ed. Law Rep. 491 (1995); 
Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 104 (5'" Cir. 1989); Norris v. Board of Educ., 797 F. 
Supp. 1452, 77 Ed. Law Rep. 255, (S.D. Ind. 1992); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Mattox, 
830 F.2d 576 (5'" Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1008 (1998); Fay v. South Colonie 
Central Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 
1267 (8'" Cir. 1977); Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246 (D.N.J. 1992); Francois v. 
Univ. of District of Columbia, 788 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. 1992); Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 
F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Pa. 
1985), affd 787 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1986); Price v. Young, 580 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 
1983). See also Lewin v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp. 1161 (E. D. 
Va. 1996); Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., No. 94-203120-6 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
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had held that FERPA does not provide a private right of ac-
tion.17 However, there is a growing trend to allow private ac-
tions based on another federal statute, which allows private 
class actions to force government compliance with other stat-
utes.18 The standard for allowing these class actions is a bit 
counter-intuitive. The underlying statute (in this case, FERPA) 
must both give the plaintiff an enforceable right and not pro-
vide another means of redress. In order for Ms. Falvo to win, 
the court should have found more than that the school district 
was in violation of FERPA. 19 It had to decide that FERPA gave 
her an enforceable right which was not taken away by express 
or implied congressional action, 20 and that this right was in fact 
violated by the grading practices in question. Of course, the lOth 
Circuit Court did decide that. 21 Whether it should have is an-
other matter. 
C. §1983 Enforceable Right and Binding Obligation 
The basic elements of a §1983 claim are: 1) is the plaintiff 
an intended beneficiary of the statute; 2) are the plaintiffs 
claims too "vague and amorphous" for the court to enforce; 3) 
does the statute impose a binding obligation on the state?22 
Few would doubt that the statute was intended to benefit stu-
dents and the parents of minor children. Indeed, Senator Buck-
ley, who proposed the statute, wanted students and parents to 
be able to view education records in order to check for inaccu-
racies.2:1 The statute names those who would benefit. 24 There is 
17. For evidence that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action, 
see the "Joint Statement." See also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (must look to 
entire legislative enactment when determining the existence of a private right). 
18. U.S.C.A. §1983 (West 2000); imposes liability on anyone who, under color of 
state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws." (quoted in 117 S.Ct. 1353); Ralph Mawdsley, Litigation Involv-
ing FERPA, 110 EDUC. LAW REP. 897, 910-11 (1996). 
19. Golden Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (holding that, 
in order to use §1983 to enforce other statutes, the plaintiff must claim that there was 
a violation of a federal right, not merely of federal law). 
20. Ackerly Communications of Florida, Inc. v. Henderson, 881 F.2d 990 (11"' Cir. 
1989) (no §1983 private right because Congress created an exclusive remedy); Wright v. 
Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987). 
21. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 966. 
22. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hospital 
Assn. 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
23. Nicholas Trott Long, Privacy in the World of Education: What Hath James 
Buckley Wrought?, 46 Feb R.I.B.J. 9 (1998); Mawdsley, supra note 18,. 
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also little doubt that Ms. Falvo's claim was very specific. She 
identified a particular grading practice and asked the court to 
eradicate it. She thus clearly meets the second element. 25 The 
third element is a little trickier, though. Some evidence sup-
ports the contention that the lO'h circuit was misled in finding 
that FERPA imposes a binding obligation on the states to com-
ply. In order to examine this we need to know what courts 
mean when they say "binding obligation." 
1. Congressional Intent 
There is a difference between a binding obligation that 
Congress places on the states and Congressional preference for 
a state action to occur. The first will fulfill the § 1983 binding 
obligation element; the second will not. The single penalty pro-
vided in the statute seems to weigh on the side of congressional 
preference rather than congressional mandate; the only reper-
cussion for disobeying FERPA provisions is a withdrawal of 
federal funding. 26 "[FERPA] conditions the receipt of federal 
education funding on compliance, rather than directly requir-
ing deference to it."27 There are no criminal sanctions. There is 
no personal liability. In fact, Senator Buckley was quite con-
cerned that teachers not bear the burden of possible violations. 
If Congress had really wanted to express a mandate that 
FERPA be followed, it would have imposed private individual 
civil sanctions rather than rely upon contractuality. 28 If Con-
gress were interested in creating a binding obligation carrying 
a private right of action, it would have anticipated and wel-
comed the possibility of actions by affected citizens against the 
persons committing the violations. 
24. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(b) & (e). 
25. For claims that have been found "too vague and amorphous," see id. at 344 
("the Court of Appeals erred ... in taking a blanket approach to determining whether 
Title IV-D creates rights.") For an example of a sufficiently well-defined claim, see 
Parry v. Crawford, 990 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Nev 1998). 
26. 20 U.S.C.A. §1232(g) (West 2000). 
27. Sandra L. Macklin , Students' Rights in Indiana: Wrongful Di.~tribution of 
Student Records and Potential Remedies, 74 IND. L.J. 1321 (Fall 1999). 
28. Federal funds may be withdrawn if they are used in ways inconsistent with 
the terms on which they were given; the Supreme Court has said that this is based 
upon contract theory. 
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2. Congressional Remedies Provision 
Congress did provide a remedy for violations. It is an ad-
ministrative remedy, but a remedy nonetheless. As set forth in 
the statute, the Family Policy Compliance Office in the De-
partment of Education is in charge of overseeing FERPA viola-
tions and investigating claims. 2~J The way the remedy is carried 
out seems to indicate a preference on the part of Congress 
rather than a mandate. Parents and students alleging viola-
tions have the opportunity to request a hearing from the Office. 
"There is no timeline for processing these complaints, no ad-
ministrative hearing provisions, and no framework for judicial 
review. There are no remedies for parties injured by [FERPA] 
violations and the onlv sanction available against schools has 
b . d ,3cf never een Impose . 
While this history may indicate the need for FERPA viola-
tions to be accessible through a § 1983 claim, it also shows that 
Congress did not intend to create an obligation for the schools 
to follow the policy. Furthermore, a viable minority rule re-
garding FERPA's administrative enforcement possibilities 
states that, "[s]ection 1983 does not create a private right for 
damages where the federal statute provides an exclusive ad-
ministrative enforcement mechanism."31 
The 10'h Circuit Court was wrong in finding that the statute 
gave Ms. Falvo and her children an enforceable civil rights 
claim. It should have dismissed the case on the grounds that 
she did not meet all elements of a §1983 claim. 
D. Statutory Construction 
The 10'h Circuit Court also erred in its refusal to look at 
Department of Education practices when it interpreted the 
statute. The Court held that FERPA is plain on its face, and 
therefore no other tools of statutory construction were neces-
sary.:32 If the statute were indeed plain on its face, the court 
would be correct. However, legal scholars' confusion and the 
opinion's internal inconsistency shows that FERPA is not clear 
29. 20 U.S.C.A. §1232(g) (West 2000); Mawdsley, supra note 18, ; Macklin, supra 
note 27. 
30. Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records 
Statute Work, 46 CAUL U. L. REV. 617 (Spring 1997). 
31. Norris v. Board of Education, 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1464 (1992). 
32. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 968. 
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within its four corners. 
III. ANALYSIS OF FALVO's MERITS 
A. FERPA's Language 
In Falvo, the lO'h Circuit Court determined Owasso's grad-
ing policy is a violation of FERPA because student-to-student 
grading is considered an improper maintaining of an educa-
tional record. In this section, the discussion will focus on the 
arguments against this interpretation of FERPA, and why the 
lOth Circuit Court was unnecessarily broad in interpreting that 
student-to-student grading is a violation thereof. 
FERPA tells us that, "[n]o Funds shall be made available 
under any applicable program to any educational agency or in-
stitution which has a policy or practice of permitting the re-
lease of education records ... of students .... "3:3 "For the pur-
poses of this section, the term 'education records' means ... 
those records, files, documents, and other materials which-(i) 
contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are 
maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a per-
son acting for such agency or institution.":J4 
First, the lOth Circuit Court concluded that a student's 
grade, before reaching the teacher's grade book, constitutes an 
"education record." The court states: "There is no dispute that 
the grades which students place on each other's papers and 
then report to the teacher 'contain information directly related 
to a student' and thus satisfy the first element of the statutory 
definition for 'education record."':1" This may be true, especially 
since it appears that Congress intended the statute's language 
to be broad with this element of "education record." But the 
court continues to carve out a broad interpretation with the 
second element of "education record": 
The grade the correcting student places on the paper is also 
"maintained", because that student is preserving the grade 
until the time it is reported to the teacher for further use. In 
sum, the grades which students mark, at the teacher's direc-
tion, on each other's homework and test papers and later re-
33. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(b)(l) (West 2000). 
34. Id. at (a)(4)(A). 
35. Falvo, 229 F.3d at 970. 
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port to the teacher are "maintained ... by a person acting for 
[an educational] agency or institution."36 
335 
The court obviously had a very difficult choice to make with 
this case, choosing between the embarrassment of students and 
creating a policy that may encourage massive confusion and in-
efficiency for teachers. But what the court seemed to miss in 
deciding for the students is that making this grading system a 
violation of FERPA is both a legal contradiction and a moot 
point in the classroom itself. 
The court claimed that its finding was "[b]ased purely on 
37 the language of the statute itself. .. " and argued that Con-
gress was clear in its intent to protect grade disclosure in 
teachers' grade books, and that FERPA is unambiguous in its 
language. When a grade is actually in a teacher's grade book, it 
may be an "education record" that is "maintained" according to 
the statute Also, the court rightly decided that the narrow ex-
ception Congress provided grade books applies only when the 
teacher discloses her grade book to a substitute.38 However, it 
is doubtful that Congress intended for the interpretation of 
"maintained by ... a person acting for [an educational] agency 
or institution" to be so broad as to include student-to-student 
grading. 
B. The Ambiguity of FERPA's Language 
1. Agency 
One must assume that Congress intended an agency rela-
tionship to apply when it chose the phrase "person acting for 
such institution or agency." Agency, as defined by Black's Law 
Dictionary, is "a fiduciary relationship created by express or 
implied contract or by law, whereby one party (the agent) may 
act on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that 
other party by words and actions." 39 Agent is defined as "one 
who is authorized to act for or in place of another; a representa-
tive."40 Courts have narrowly construed agency relationships 
between students and schools; they are hesitant to assign the 
36. /d. at 971. 
37. /d. at 969. 
38. See id. at 970. 
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 63 (6'" ed. 1990). 
40. !d. at 62. 
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agent label to students because of potential liability. 41 In con-
junction with Black's definition of "agent" ("one who is author-
ized to act for or in place of another,")42 the decision in Booker 
v. Chicago Board of Education 43 should be persuasive. The 
court in Booker said that the student hall monitor had no re-
sponsibility given her by the teacher because "her function was 
to report any misbehavior to the teacher."44 The hall monitor 
had no authority to decide what comprised the infractions, only 
that the infractions happened. It is the same situation with 
students grading other students' papers-the grading student 
has no authority to decide what is a right or wrong answer; she 
can only mark answers "correct" or "incorrect" according to 
what the teacher tells her is "correct" and "incorrect." 
Since a student in almost all cases does not fit the defini-
tion of "agent," the court incorrectly stated that the FERPA 
statute is "unambiguous." There is no legislative history ex-
plaining what the phrase meant to the legislators, nor is there 
any further guidance from Congress as to what "maintaining" 
and "person acting" specifically refers. If Congress was unwill-
ing to define this further, the court may decide its breadth but 
not without admitting that it is unclear on its face. 
2. Consent 
Referring to the consent requirement in an agency relation-
ship, the court in Wickey v. Dawn Sparks stated, "[a]gency is a 
relationship resulting from the manifestation of consent by one 
party to another that the latter will act as an agent for the 
41. See Booker v. Chicago Board of Education, 75 III. App. 3d 381 (1979), where 
the court found a student hall monitor was not an agent of the school when she as-
saulted another student in a school bathroom; Knapp v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 376 
(1995) where the court found no agency relationship where a student was directed by a 
teacher to bring his car into the shop area and drive it out again when class was over, 
stating "such control alone is insufficient to establish a principal-agent relationship" 
!d. at 380; Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999), where the Court 
found a school district can be held liable for student-on-student sexual harassment only 
for that district's own failure to respond to such harassment, but not liable for the stu-
dent's inappropriate behavior, thus coming under sexual discrimination and violating 
Equal Protection; Christensen v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 
248 Iowa 810 (1957), where the court found an agency relationship where a medical 
intern performs as a practitioner of the medical profession under the guidance of col-
lege-affiliated hospital staff. 
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (6'" ed. 1990) (emphasis added). 
43. 75 Ill. App. 3d 381 (1979). 
44. !d. at 455. 
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former."45 Students certainly do not consent to being agents for 
the school, nor do their parents, thus the student cannot be 
considered an agent of the school. 
3. The Rooker Letter 
The Falvo court should not have dismissed consideration of 
the "Rooker Letter" as it did. The "Rooker Letter," written by 
the Director of the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) 
within the United States Department of Education, LeRoy S. 
Rooker, was a 1993 response to inquiries made by the New 
York State United Teachers union representative about the le-
gality under FERPA of certain school policies. The Rooker Let-
ter states that 
FERPA would not prohibit teachers from allowing students to 
grade a test or homework assignment of another student or 
from calling out that grade in class, even though such grade 
may eventually become an education record. Such papers be-
ing graded and the grades which will be assigned would fall 
outside the FERPA definition of education records as they are 
not, strictly speaking, "maintained" by an educational agency 
or institution at that point. 46 
The lOth Circuit Court claims that "the Rooker letter ... [isJ 
bereft of any reasoning underlying the rather conclusory opin-
ion that grades written down by other students and announced 
to the teacher are not 'maintained' as required under 
FERPA". 47 Ironically, the court commits the same error it con-
demns by neglecting to give any definable reason for why it 
rules that grades written down are "maintained" under 
FERPA. Similarly, the court only states that "in so assisting 
the teacher, the correcting student becomes a 'person acting for 
[an educational] agency or institution."'48 In this, the court ac-
tually creates a tautology; the court says that the student is 
acting as the school's agent because the student assists that 
teacher in an agent capacity. It is both inequitable and legally 
impractical for the court to adopt this circular logic. 
Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
45. 642 N.E.2d 262, 269 (2d D.Ct. 1994). 
46. Rooker Letter (Dept. of Educ. 1993). 
47. Falvo, 229 F. 3d at 969. 
48. Id. at 971. 
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Council, Inc., 49 a court must defer to the reasonable interpreta-
tion set out in a regulation pronounced by the agency in charge 
of administering the statute, when that statute the court is 
asked to construe is ambiguous. Even though the Sufreme 
Court recently stated in Christensen u. Harris Count/ that, 
"the Chevron deference does not extend to an interpretation 
contained in an opinion letter issued by the administering 
agency,"51 the Court also stated that, "interpretations contained 
in agency opinion letters 'are entitled to respect."'52 Even if the 
deference is not necessary, because FERPA is ambiguous, the 
lOth Circuit Court should have given greater respect than it did 
to the "Rooker Letter." 
C. Practical Impact 
1. Implications for the Teachers 
In the wake of the Falvo decision, school teachers have had 
to make drastic changes to accommodate this new law. But 
there is one situation in which there has been no change,and is 
proper within the lOth Circuit Court's interpretation of FERPA: 
students who are teachers' assistants (T.A.'s). To be able to re-
cord grades in the teachers' grade books, these student T.A.'s 
must sign a confidentiality statement and in essence contract 
to become a school official in that capacity. Many teachers, 
even before the lOth Circuit Court's ruling, were following this 
policy. The point is this: if the student T.A. must sign a con-
tract to become an agent of the school, how does it make sense 
for every other student to become that school's same agent 
when they do not consent to contract, make no agreement with 
the teacher or the school, and do not even record the grades in 
the teacher's grade book? 
While Ms. Falvo's feelings are understandable, and the em-
barrassment her children suffered unfortunate, this case in-
volved an individual privacy issue, not a statutory privacy is-
sue, i.e. this problem should have been handled by the teacher 
on an individual basis between the Falvo children, the teacher, 
49. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
50. 120 S.Ct. 1655 (2000). 
51. Falvo, 229 F. 3d at 969. 
52. !d. at 969, quoting Christensen, 120 S.Ct. at 1663; See also Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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and Ms. Falvo. In fact, Ms. Falvo apparently never tried to talk 
to her children's teachers-she went directly to the school 
counselors and the superintendent to have the grading policy 
ceased schoolwide. She could have asked the teacher to call for 
her children's grades in confidence. She could have consulted 
the teacher about a trusted friend that could possibly grade her 
children's papers instead of someone who would make fun of 
them. She may have wished to avoid making the situation 
worse for her children, and instead sought a pre-emptive strike 
by circumventing the teachers' authority altogether. Unfortu-
nately, pre-emptive strikes sometimes create much larger prob-
lems than the ones they try to avoid in the first place. In this 
case, Ms. Falvo wanted more than just to alleviate her own 
children's embarrassment; she sought to rescue all children 
from the grading policy, assuming she knew best for all the 
students' situations, with the sad result of unnecessarily ex-
panding the scope of a federal statute. 
2. Implications for the Students 
The last point that requires discussion is the practical effect 
this decision has had on the students themselves. Again, the 
lOth Circuit Court clearly wanted to relieve the children of any 
future embarrassment. But what Judge Murphy and the two 
other panel judges did not realize is that children know who is 
getting good grades and who is getting the bad grades anyway. 
In fact, some students even call aloud just after the grading is 
done, "Hey, who has my test? Whad'I get?" Even when numbers 
are given to the students to ensure confidentiality, many stu-
dents ask who has their numbered test. Students generally 
want the immediacy of having their papers graded. The Falvo 
decision may eradicate the procedure of peer grading, but it 
does nothing to really protect privacy in the classroom, and we 
cannot expect the courts to silence each individual child at that 
point. Granted, the students can grade their own papers, and 
some teachers have had to adopt this tactic with careful hesita-
tion.5a But why does the solution have to be so confined? The 
53. It is more likely that cheating would occur when students grade their own pa-
pers than if they were to grade another's papers. It also causes serious inefficiency if 
the teachers had to grade all the homework assignments themselves. Ms. Falvo did 
state that her A-student eighth grader was hurt by another student who bullies her 
and grades her papers wrong when they are right, see Scott Cooper, Owasso Case Be-
fore Judge, Tulsa World, Oct. 15, 1998, ai 11; thai is where the teacher has the ulti-
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solution is not so limited as the lOth Circuit Court would have 
one believe. 
D. Public Policy 
The Falvo decision is bad policy for several reasons. First, it 
places control for teaching methods not in the hands of local 
authorities or even local parent-teacher associations, but in the 
hands of the federal government. School functions have tradi-
tionally been kept at a level of local control. While "local" does 
sometimes mean as broad a territory as the state, it has never 
meant an area as large as that encompassed by a federal Cir-
cuit Court's jurisdiction. Local control is a better because it en-
ables the parents of the children at the schools to have a voice 
on what goes on with their specific children. Falvo takes this 
choice away from many parents in the realm of the lOth circuit. 
This is not to say that Ms. Falvo did not have noble intent, 
nor that FERPA in any respect fails to protect individual pri-
vacy rights. However, Ms. Falvo and the lOth Circuit Court ne-
glect to distinguish between knowledge of grades and disclo-
sure of grades-"[FERPA's] apparent purpose is to ensure 
access to educational records for students and parents and to 
protect the privacy of such records from the public at large.""4 
When the court decided that knowledge of grades equals disclo-
sure of an education record, it took a logical leap into territory 
which has never before been addressed and which leads to 
abundant policy problems. Perhaps calling the grades out in 
class steps over that knowledge-disclosure line, a problem 
which again could have been dealt with by simply discussing it 
with the teacher. But there is nothing convincing about Johnny 
knowing that Susie got a 13/16 on her spelling test, writing 
that score on her paper, and giving it back to her to give to the 
teacher to record that in itself constitutes a violation of 
FERPA. 
It is also bad public policy to declare that the student work 
itself is the education record. While this may make sense when 
mate and final say in the grade received by all students. But was Ms. Falvo worried 
about the grading policy itself, or the fact that her child was being bullied? The next 
court deciding this issue should carefully distinguish between a serious breach of pri-
vacy and the all-too-common bullying of other students before ruling on such a far-
reaching policy. 
54. Student Press Law Center v. Alexander, 778 F.Supp. 1227, 1228 (emphasis 
added). 
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teachers maintain the works in locally-mandated portfolios, it 
leads us to the anomalous situation of kindergartners not being 
able to display their art in the classroom without parental con-
sent. What about art class? The point is that the Falvo decision 
makes it difficult or impossible for some educational purposes 
to be fulfilled. Displaying student art and papers creates an in-
centive for students do their best work, and shows examples of 
how to do assignments. Teachers commonly use student-graded 
quizzes as a check of what the students understand. There are 
those who would scoff at these possibilities, and currently there 
is no indication that Falvo will be interpreted even more 
broadly to exclude any and all displays. But as commonly dis-
cussed in law classrooms around the nation, there is definitely 
potential for that slippery slope. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If teachers cannot use the tool of peer to peer grading, they 
are left with three unsavory choices: 1) grade the papers them-
selves; 2) have the students grade their own; or 3) forego the 
comprehension checks. The first option is impractical simply 
because of the time it would take. The second carries an inher-
ently greater likelihood of cheating. With the third option, 
teachers would be less effective because they would not have 
the information necessary to tailor their lessons to each class. 
Of course students would want to protect the privacy of their 
portfolios. But those are already protected by the fact that the 
teacher maintains them. 55 They do not need additional protec-
tion. There is nothing in the lOth Circuit Court or the Supreme 
Court case history dictating the Falvo decision of the court of 
appeals. In fact, there is enough ambiguity as to the construc-
tion of statutory elements of the claims to allow for another de-
cision. Substantive and policy arguments show why the school 
district should have been favored in this matter. The district 
followed practice set by the Education Department. The Educa-
tion Department, as the education agency of the Federal gov-
ernment, has the job of setting such practices. 
55. Like a gradebook, portfolios would be maintained by an agent of the school, 
and therefore not classifiable as "released." 
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Hopefully, when other circuits address this issue as they even-
tually must, they will recall the policy nightmare of Falvo and 
make a better choice. 
Amy Bennett 
Adrienne Brower 
